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NOTES
this offer for an indefinite period of time. In denying the nonjoining
owner's claim, neither are his contract rights violated nor is the devel-
opment of his mineral interest impaired.
William T. Carlisle
Protection of Fourteenth Amendment Rights Under
Section 241 of the United States Criminhal Code
For almost one hundred years there has been uncertainty as to the
protection of fourteenth amendment rights under section 241 of the
United States Code of Crimes and Criminal Procedure1 which makes
it a felony to conspire to interfere with a citizen's exercise and enjoy-
ment of rights secured by laws or Constitution of the United States.
The securing of fourteenth amendment rights raises the issue of defin-
ing the appropriate state action necessary to violate these rights. The
Supreme Court was confronted with these issues, among others, in the
recently decided cases of United States v. Price' and United States v.
Guest."
I. SECTION 241 AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS
Shortly after the ratification of the fifteenth amendment,4 Congress
enacted the Enforcement Act of 1870' in response to national con-
cern over the denial of rights to Negroes in southern states during the
Reconstruction era.' The sponsor of section 6 of the act (now section
241) indicated that he intended the statute to protect fourteenth
'18 U.S.C. S 241 (1964).
2383 U.S. 787 (1966).
'383 U.S. 745 (1966).
4 
February 3, 1870.
'An Act to Enforce the Right of Citizens of the United States to vote in the several
States of this Union, and for other Purposes (the Enforcement Act of 1870), 16 Stat. 140
(May 31, 1870). For purposes of clarity, §§ 241 and 242, as well as their predecessors will
be referred to hereinafter as § 241 or § 242. A detailed record of the changes in the two
statutes since their original enactment is located in the index to Mr. Justice Frankfurter's
opinion in United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 70, 83 (1951). Though the rights which the
original versions of the two statutes provide were not coextensive, the stautes in their present
forms do protect against deprivations of the same rights. The only difference is that S 241
punishes for conspiracies; whereas § 242 punishes for substantive violations under color of
law of the rights in question. Screw v. United States 325 U.S. 91, 119 (1945) (concurring
opinion of Rutledge, J.). Further, § 241 speaks to "two or more persons"; whereas § 242
deals with "whoever, under color of law."
'See United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787 (1966); United States v. Williams, 341 U.S.
70, 92 (1951) (dissent of Douglas, J.); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 113 (1945)
(concurring opinion of Rutledge, J.); United States v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383, 387-88 (1915);
STAMP, THE ERA OF RECONSTRUCTION (1965); Frantz, Congressional Power To Enforce
the Fourteenth Amendment Against Private Acts, 73 YALE L.J. 1353 (1964).
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amendment rights which were being denied to Negroes in the South.7
Decisions of the lower federal courts in 1871 held that section 241
did protect fourteenth amendment rights.8
With the end of the Reconstruction era the United States Supreme
Court began to limit the rights covered by the proscriptions of section
241. This limitation was first effected in United States v. Cruikshank"
when the Court seemingly held that section 241 applies to and pro-
tects only certain rights "granted to the people by the Constitution or
laws of the United States."'" In accordance with the then contem-
porary constitutional theory,1 the rights mentioned in the fourteenth
amendment found their origin in natural law and thus were not rights
granted by the Constitution within the meaning of the statute. Deci-
sions following Cruilkshank further clarified the rights to be protected
by section 241. These cases held that the section protects those rights
set forth in Crandall v. Nevada" and the Slaughter-House Cases"
which are necessary to the integrity of the federal governmental insti-
tution" and those which are created by Congress in the legitimate ex-
ercise of its article I powers." The Slaughter-House Cases" listed cer-
tain of these rights.
The Court's point of view shifted in 1915. Mr. Justice Holmes, in
United States v. Mosley," observed that section 241 protects all federal
' See Appendix to United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 807-20 (1966). See also FLACK,
ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 203 (1908).
sEx Parte Riggins, 134 Fed. 404 (N.D. Ala. 1904), petition for writ of habeas corpus
dism., 199 U.S. 547 (1905); United States v. Mall, 26 Fed. Cas. 1147 (No. 15712)
(C.C.S.D. Ala. 1871); United States v. Hall, 26 Fed. Cas. 79 (No. 15282) (C.C.S.D. Ala.
1871).
992 U.S. 542 (1876).
"0Id. at 551. See Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915); Ex parte Yarbrough,
110 U.S. 652 (1884).
" See, e.g., Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873); Frantz, Congressional
Power To Enforce the Fourteenth Amendment Against Private Acts, 73 YALE L.J. 1353,
1370-73 (1964); HAINES, THE REVIVAL OF NATURAL LAW CONCEPTS (1930); HARDING,
NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1955).
173 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1868).
"383 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).4 See Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458 (1900). Compare Logan v. United States,
144 U.S. 263 (1892) with United States v. Powell, 212 U.S. 564 (1908).
"United States v. Waddell, 112 U.S. 76 (1884); Ex Parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 652
(1884).
'683 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
"7 The right of a citizen to travel to the seat of the government to assert claims against
it, to transact business with it, to seek its protection, to share its offices, to engage in ad-
ministering its functions; the right to free access to all sea-ports handling foreign commerce,
to sub-treasuries, land-offices, and courts of justice in the several states; the right to demand
the care and protection of the government over his life, liberty, or property when on the
high seas or within the jurisdiction of a foreign government; the right to peaceably assemble
and petition for redress of grievances; the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; the right
to use the navigable waters of the United States; all rights secured by treaties with foreign
nations; the right to become a citizen of a state by bona fide residence therein, with the same
rights as other citizens of that state. Id. at 79-80.
Is238 U.S. 383, 387-88 (1915).
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rights "in the lump"'" and should not be construed so as ". . . to de-
prive citizens ... of the general protection which on its face [section
241] most reasonably affords."2 Mr. Justice Holmes' construction of
section 241 was repeated thirty years later in dicta. Mr. Justice Rut-
ledge, concurring in Screws v. United States," stated that fourteenth
amendment rights are within the scope of section 241. Mr. Justice
Murphy, even though dissenting,2 agreed with this statement.
Mosley had seemingly obviated the issue of coverage of fourteenth
amendment rights by section 241." Thirty-six years later the decision
in United States v. Williams" revived the problem."5 The Court di-
vided evenly on the construction of section 241." Mr. Justice Frank-
furter, speaking on behalf of himself and three other members of the
Court, stated that section 241 did not protect fourteenth amend-
ment rights. He determined that section 241 dealt only with "rights
that flow from the substantive powers of Federal Government"" and
"that the purpose of section 241 was to reach private action rather
than officers of a State acting under its authority.""2 Therefore, section
241 protected only rights which Congress could secure against the
interference of private individuals and did not protect rights! which
the Constitution "merely guarantees from abridgement by the
States"'2" from interference by state officers. In a dissent joined by
three other justices, Mr. Justice Douglas noted that section 241 had
ben applied to the protection of fourteenth amendment rights in pre-





2' 325 U.S. 91, 120 (1945) (concurring opinion of Rutledge, J.).
"2Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 135 (1945) (dissent of Murphy, J.).
"3United States v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383 (1915).
24 341 U.S. 70 (1951). There are three "Williams" cases arising out of the same fact sit-
uation. The "Williams" case just cited will be referred to in this Note as Williams. The first
case, United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 58 (1951), involved a prosecution for perjury.
The third, Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97 (1951), was a prosecution for violation
of § 242 which held that § 242 protects fourteenth amendment rights.
'Compare United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 70 (1951) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.)
with United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 70, 87-96 (1951) (dissenting opinion of Douglas,
J.).
26 The majority in Williams was composed of the four Justices for whom Mr. Justice
Frankfurter spoke. Mr. Justice Black concurred on other grounds without consideration
of the scope of § 241. United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 70, 85 (1951) (concurring
opinion of Black, J.). The issue was thus left unresolved.
21 United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 70, 78 (1951) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
"' Ibid.
29 Ibid.
-"See Ex parte Riggins, 134 Fed. 404 (N.D. Ala. 1904), petition for writ of habeas
corpus dism., 199 U.S. 547 (1905); United States v. Mall, 26 Fed. Cas. 1147 (No 15712)
(C.C.S.D. Ala. 1871); United States v. Hall, 26 Fed. Cas. 79 (No. 15282) (C.C.S.D. Ala.
1871).
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Despite the division of the Court in Williams, lower federal courts'
have followed Mr. Justice Frankfurter's view that ". . . the rights
which section 241 protects are those which Congress may constitu-
tionally secure against interference by private individuals."3 This
category "excludes those rights which the Constitution merely guar-
antees from interference by a State.""3 Thus section 241 was not
applied to interference by a state or state officers. Moreover, in cases
dealing with the fourteenth amendment itself, the Supreme Court was
careful to note that the fourteenth amendment protects against state
action only, not against wrongs done by private individuals.'
II. THE CONCEPT OF STATE ACTION
The fourteenth amendment places certain restraints on states' ac-
tions." The courts have consistently held that some form of state ac-
tion is necessary before an individual's rights under the amendment
can be violated," but there has been much litigation as to what con-
stitutes such state action. The Supreme Court has declared that a
state can act through any of its governmental branches, agencies, or
officials in a manner which would violate the fourteenth amendment. 7
State action may occur in a variety of situations. In United States v.
Classic"s and Screws v. United States" the Court held that state action
included conduct by state officials that exceeded express statutory au-
"' See, e.g., Alabama v. United States, 304 F.2d 583, 595 (5th Cir. 1962) (dissenting
opinion of Cameron, J.); Byrd v. Sexton, 277 F.2d 418, 429 (8th Cir. 1960); Hoffman v.
Halden, 268 F.2d 280 (9th Cir. 1959); Baldwin v. Morgan, 251 F.2d 780, 789-91 (5th
Cir. 1958); Brewer v. Hoxie School Dist. No. 46, 238 F.2d 91 (8th Cir. 1956); United
States v. Guest, 246 F. Supp. 483 (M.D. Ga. 1965); Negrich v. Hohn, 246 F. Supp. 175
(W.D. Pa. 1965); United States v. Bailes, 120 F. Supp. 614, 621-27 (S.D.W.Va. 1954).
"s United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 70 (1951) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
3Id. at 77.
' See, e.g., Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964); Robinson v. Florida, 378 U.S. 153
(1964); Griffin v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 130 (1964); Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267
(1963); Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963); Burton v. Wilmington Park-
ing Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961); Pennsylvania
v. Board of Trusts, 353 U.S. 230 (1957); Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651 (1951).
as,"No State shall make or enforce . . . nor shall any State deprive . . . nor deny."
U.S. CozqsT. amend. XIV, 5 1.
"'Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964); Griffin v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 130 (1964);
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Collins v. Hardyman, 341
U.S. 651 (1951); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); United States v. Powell, 212 U.S.
564 (1908); Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1 (1905); Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S.
652 (1884); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629
(1883). Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) holds that "under color of law" in S 242 is
state action within the scope of the fourteenth amendment.
" See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 14, 15-20 (1948); Civil Rights Cases, 109
U.S. 3, 11, 17 (1883); Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 347 (1879); Virginia v. Rives,
100 U.S. 313, 318 (1880).
a3 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
39325 U.S. 91 (1945).
thority4° or was a misuse of that authority."' Shelley v. Kraemer"
held that judicial enforcement of discriminatory private covenants was
state action violative of the fourteenth amendment.' Moreover, pri-
vate persons or organizations may be exercising such governmental
authority that their actions constitute state action." In Burton v. Wil-
mington Parking Authority45 the Court stated that there was state
action within the scope of the fourteenth amendment whenever: "The
state has so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence
with [the private individual denying the Fourteenth Amendment
rights] that it must be recognized as a joint participant in the chal-
lenged activity."" Burton further held that states have the duty
to take positive action to insure that individuals are not deprived of
the equal use and enjoyment of public facilities owned or operated
by or on behalf of the state. If a state does fail to discharge its respon-
sibility, its inaction would constitute action by the state in violation
of the fourteenth amendment.
The Court, in applying the Burton view of state action, has recent-
ly held, in Griffin v. Maryland,47 that when an individual, authorized
by the state, purports to act under that authority, his action consti-
tutes state action. It is immaterial that he could have perpetrated the
identical act in a purely private capacity or that he was unauthorized
by state law to perform the particular action. Though the Court has
been expanding the concept of state action to include what was pre-
viously private action, under the Burton view of state action there is
still a question as to how far a state must "insinuate itself into a posi-
tion of interdependence, 48 with an individual before the Court will
find state action sufficient to violate the fourteenth amendment.4 '
The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment creates
special problems. The clause prohibits any denial by a state of equal
4 0 ibid.
41 United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
42334 U.S. 1 (1948).
4 Ibid. See also Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953); Hurd v. Hodges, 334 U.S.
24 (1948).
"Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Terry v. Adams,
345 U.S. 461 (1953); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Smith v. Allwright, 321
U.S. 649 (1944); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536
(1927); Rice v. Elmore, 165 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 875 (1948).
4-365 U.S. 715 (1961).
41 Ibid.
47378 U.S. 130 (1964).4
sBurton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961).
"'See text and authorities supra notes 38, 39, 41-47. See generally Abernathy, Expansion
of the State Action Concept Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 43 CORNELL L.Q. 375
(1958); Horowitz, The Misleading Search for "State Action" Under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, 30 So. CAL. L. REV. 208 (1957); Lewis, The Meaning of State Action, 60 COLUM. L.
REV. 1083 (1960); McKenney, An Argument in Favor of Strict Adherence to the "State
Action" Requirement, 5 WILLIAM & MARY L. REV. 213 (1964).
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protection of the law to any person within its jurisdiction." As Mr.
Justice Goldberg observed in his separate opinion in Bell v. Maryland:1
Denying includes inaction as well as action. And denying the equal pro-
tection of the laws includes the omission to protect, as well as the omis-
sion to pass laws for protection. These views are fully consonant with
this Court's recognition that state conduct which might be described
as 'inaction' can nevertheless constitute 'state action' within the mean-
ing of the Fourteenth Amendment."2
However, in Bell the Court avoided determining whether or not state
inaction is sufficient to violate the fourteenth amendment."
III. UNITED STATES V. PRICE AND UNITED STATES v. GUEST
In United States v. Price" eighteen individuals, including three po-
lice officers, were indicted in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Mississippi for a conspiracy to release three civil
rights workers from the Neshoba County, Mississippi, jail, intercept
them, and kill them. One of the indictments was brought under sec-
tion 241. The district court dismissed this indictment on the ground
that the broad protection afforded to "rights and privileges secured
by the Constitution or laws of the United States"5 by section 241 did
not include rights protected by the fourteenth amendment." Pursuant
to section 3731 of the United States Code of Crimes and Criminal
Procedure," the case was appealed directly to the United States Su-
50""No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
5' 378 U.S. 226, 286 (1964) (opinion of Goldberg, J.). The Chief Justice and Mr.
Justice Douglas joined in this opinion.
s2Id .at 309-12. See, e.g., Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953); Terry v. Adams,
345 U.S. 461 (1953); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Marsh v. Alabama, 326
U.S. 501 (1946). See also, United States v. Hall, 26 Fed. Cas. 79, 81 (C.C.S.D. Ala. 1871);
Letter from Mr. Justice Bradley to Circuit Judge (later Justice) William B. Woods (un-
published draft) Mar. 12, 1871, in the Bradley papers on file at The New Jersey Historical
Society, Newark, New Jersey.
" The Court did not reach the constitutional questions since it was necessary to vacate
the judgment and remand to the state court for consideration of the effect of a supervening
change in the state statute on the convictions under review. Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226
(1964) (opinion of Brennan, J.).
54383 U.S. 787 (1966).
55 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1964). The defendants were also indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 242
which makes it a misdemeanor for one, acting under color of law, to deprive another of
rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the
United States. The district court dismissed as to the nonofficial defendants on the ground
that the indictment did not allege that they were officers either in fact or de facto in any
act purportedly done by them under color of law. The Supreme Court reversed the district
court, holding that private individuals, who wilfully participate in a joint activity with a
state or its agents which is prohibited by the Constitution or laws of the United States are
acting under color of the law. United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787 (1966).
e United States v. Price, No. 60, S.D. Miss., Jan. 15, 1965.
7 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1964).
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preme Court from the district court dismissal. Reversing and remand-
ing, " the Court finally resolved the issue United States v. Williams"
left unresolved. The Court held that section 241 protects every right
secured by the Constitution." The Court interpreted such rights to
include all rights expressly or impliedly stated in the Constitution,
a fortiori fourteenth amendment rights. By so construing the statute,
the Court, after ninety-six years, has accorded the statute the scope
which its sponsor apparently intended it to have"' and which the sta-
tutory language plainly indicates."
Price was specifically concerned with the infringement of the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The Court relied on
Grifin v. Maryland"3 and Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority"4
to find that the allegations of the involvement of police officials were
clearly allegations of state action contrary to the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment. The penal provisions of section 24165
would therefore apply both to the police officials and to their co-
conspirators," if on remand, the Government were to establish the
facts as alleged.
In United States v. Guest" six individuals were indicted under sec-
tion 241 in the United States District Court for the Middle District
of Georgia for a conspiracy to deprive Negro citizens of "the right to
equal utilization, without discrimination upon the basis of race, of
public facilities in the vicinity of Athens, Georgia, owned, operated
or managed by or on the behalf of the State of Georgia or any sub-
division thereof."" The indictment alleged that one of the means
56 United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787 (1966).
a934 1 U.S. 70 (1951).
o United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787 (1966).
,1 See Appendix to United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 807 (1966).
62 United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 800 (1966). It is interesting to compare the his-
torical background behind § 241, the end of the reconstruction era, and the current civil
rights controversy and relate each set of historical circumstances to the Court's holdings
with regard to the fourteenth amendment and § 241 during these periods. See e.g., BARKER,
FREEDOMS, COURTS, POLITICS (1965); BOWERS, THE TRAGIC ERA (1929); FLEMING, DOC-
UMENTARY HISTORY OF RECONSTRUCTION (1906); FRAENKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND
CIVIL LIBERTIES (1952 ed.); FRIEDMAN, SOUTHERN JUSTICE (1965); JAMES, THE FRAMING
Os THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1956); MARSHALL, FEDERALISM AND CIVIL RIGHTS
(1964); SHUBERT, CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS (1960).
63378 U.S. 130 (1964).
64365 U.S. 715 (1961).
65 The penalty under § 241 is a fine of not more than $5,000, or imprisonment for not
more than ten years, or both. 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1964).
66 It is immaterial that some of the defendants were not state officials, since they were
alleged to be wilful participants in a conspiracy with state officials. United States v. Rabino-
wich, 238 U.S. 78 (1915). This same reasoning applies to § 242's applicability to the non-
official defendants.
67383 U.S. 745 (1966).
66 Id. at 747-48. The text of the indictment is reprinted in footnote I therein. The other
alleged violations dealt with the full and equal enjoyment of public accommodations under
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of accomplishing the object of the conspiracy was causing the arrest
of Negroes with false reports that the Negroes had committed crimes.
On the defendants' motion the district court dismissed the indict-
ment,9 determining that the indictment alleged only an invasion of
fourteenth amendment rights which section 241 does not protect. On
direct appeal under section 3731 of the United States Code of Crimes
and Criminal Procedure," the United States Supreme Court reversed
and remanded,71 holding that equal protection clause rights, as well as
due process rights are protected by section 241.
Unlike Price, none of of the defendants in Guest were state officials.
In order for the indictment to stand, there had to be an allegation of
state action sufficient to violate the equal protection clause.7' The
Court found that the allegation of furthering the conspiracy by
causing false arrests of Negroes was an allegation of state involve-
ment, sufficient at least to require denial of the motion to dismiss the
indictment.74
The Court did not resolve the following issues: (1) whether a pri-
vate individual's invocation of state officials to enforce a private pol-
icy of discrimination is state action, and (2) whether state inaction
Title II of Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a) (1964), public highways, and
the right to travel freely to and from the state of Georgia and use of the instrumentalities
of interstate commerce.
69 United States v. Guest, 246 F. Supp. 475 (M.D. Ga. 1965).
o18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1964).
7 United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
72 Id. at 753. The Court stated that its holding did not render the statute unconstitu-
tionally vague, since the gravemen of a violation of § 241 is a conspiracy; and this satisfies
the requirement that the offender must act with a specific intent to interfere with the fed-
eral rights in question. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945). The Court thus an-
swered the question of the constitutionality of § 241 in the same way it had answered the
question with regard to § 242, in Screws, supra note 21.
As to the other counts of the indictment, the Court held that it did not have jurisdiction
to review the dismissal of the count dealing with the alleged violations of the right to equal
enjoyment of public accommodations since dismissal was rested in the alternative on a defect
in pleading. United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188 (1939). The Court held that the
right to travel to and from a state and use the instrumentalities of interstate commerce is
protected by the Constitution. This right has been established under the commerce clause
in Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941) and as a privilege or immunity of national
citizenship under the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873); Crandall v.
Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1868) (fundamental privilege of national citizenship). These
rights are thus protected by § 241. The defendants could be convicted under 5 241 only if
they acted with the specific intent to interfere with the federal right of ingress to and eg-
ress from a state. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 101 (1945). The right to use local
facilities is included by the Court in its discussion of the right to equal use of those public
facilities owned by the state.
a See text and authorities supra note 36.
7 The Court was not faced with the problem of finding state action as regards the al-
leged violation of the right to travel to and from a state or use the instrumentalities of in-
terstate commerce since rights are secured to citizens, independently of the fourteenth amend-
ment, under the theory of fundamental privileges and immunities of national citizenship set
forth in Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1868) and the commerce clause. Ed-
wards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
which permits private discrimination is state action. With regard to
the first issue, the Court compared the facts in the case in point to
those in Bell v. Maryland.7 It added, however, that the three separate
opinions in Bell were inconclusive " and therefore remanded the case
to the lower court without setting out guidelines for determining state
action through invocation. With regard to the second issue, the Court
stated that it did not have to determine "the threshold level that state
action must attain in order to create rights under the Equal Protection
Clause," 7 but, through the Court's analysis and use of case authori-
ty,"8 it implied that state inaction which results in a denial of equal use
and enjoyment of state-owned facilities to any individual might be
state action prohibited by the fourteenth amendment.
IV. CONCLUSION
In Price the Court determined that all constitutional rights, in-
cluding fourteenth amendment rights, are protected by section 241.
This necessarily would include protection against state action. In this
latter respect United States v. Guest is more significant for its impli-
cations than it is for its actual holding. Guest specifically found alle-
gations that the defendants caused false arrests of Negroes to be
sufficient allegations of state involvement under the equal protection
clause. It should be noted that, in discussing Bell v. Maryland, the
Court did not reject Mr. Justice Goldberg's separate opinion in Bell,
that denial of equal protection rights includes denial by inaction as
well as by action.
The dictum in Guest concerning the "undetermined threshold
level"' of state action implies that the limits of state action may be
expanded in the future. Under Burton, Griffin, and Shelley state action
'5 378 U.S. 226 (1964).
76 Three Justices in Bell were of the opinion that a private individual's recourse to state
police and judicial action to carry out his own policy of racial discrimination was sufficient
to violate the equal protection clause rights of those who were the objects of the discrimi-
nation. Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 242 (1964) (separate opinion of Douglas, J.); Id.
at 286 (separate opinion of Goldberg, J.). Three Justices disagreed with this view, Id. at
318 (dissenting opinion of Blac, J).; and three Justices did not consider the question, Id.
at 226. This point has now become less important to the extent that the facilities and services
are covered by Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a, dealing with public
accommodations. See Hamm v. City of Rock Hill and Lupper v. Arkansas, 379 U.S. 306
(1964). State action no longer seems necessary with regard to violations of the right to
equal use and enjoyment of "public accommodations" within the meaning of the act. This
right is now secured independently of the fourteenth amendment, and thus § 241 could
reach purely private conspiracies to deprive individuals of rights under this portion of the
act.
77 United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 756 (1966).
7' The Court, in discussing the concept of state action, relied on Burton v. Wilmington
Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961), see text supra notes 45, 46.
v" United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 756 (1966).
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